Why the Ukrainian 2023 counter offensive failed

In 2023 the Ukrainian armed forces launched a much-anticipated counter offensive which failed to live up to its expectations.

In the beginning of 2023 Ukraine faced a difficult choice.

If they didn’t advertise the counter offensive, they wouldn’t receive as much western aid and would therefore be unable to launch any counter offensive.

If they did advertise the counter offensive, they would receive much more western aid and would therefore be able to launch a counter offensive.

However, delays in receiving this aid would give the Russians more time to build their defensive lines which started construction at the end of 2022.

These defensive lines consisted of anti-tank ditches, dragons’ teeth and trenches, interspersed with dense minefields.

Most analysts, and the Russian military, expected the counteroffensive to attempt to cut the so-called land bridge to Crimea.

Ukraine decided to split its assault along 3 directions, however even if we assume that Ukraine had launched all of its forces in a single direction, as advised by the west, and had enough armoured vehicles, which is questionable, it still lacked other vital equipment to make the attack a success.

For an attack against such fortified lines, it is necessary to have control of the air to destroy enemy air power and important ground targets, such as enemy force concentrations, artillery and electronic warfare systems, sufficient electronic warfare systems to disrupt enemy drones and enough of your own drones for reconnaissance and attack.

Instead, Ukraine was expected to launch an attack that no NATO country would even attempt, advancing in armoured columns through deep minefields, without sufficient equipment or any air superiority while getting hit by enemy drones, artillery and aviation.

The result was inevitable that Ukraine would suffer heavy losses which would force it to change its tactics by advancing in small groups of infantry to minimise casualties.

The counter offensive may have failed to reach its goal of capturing Melitopol to cut the land bridge, or its minimum objective of reaching Tokmak, however no nation would be likely to achieve any more under similar circumstances and if the west commits to properly arming Ukraine with the tools it needs, then Ukraine may be able to launch a much more successful counter offensive in 2025.

 

Images and Information Credit:

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