The problem with de-alerting nuclear weapons


Many people consider the de-alerting of nuclear weapons to be a positive step towards reducing the likelihood of nuclear war, however, despite its advantages, many fail to address the inherent issues that prevent this concept from becoming a reality.

Let’s consider the practicality of de alerting the various parts of the nuclear triad.

Bombers can be de alerted by keeping them unfuelled and keeping their weapons locked inside nearby weapons storage facilities, this is something an adversary could verify using near real time surveillance satellites.

Requiring aircraft to be both fuelled and armed before take-off would take many hours and be readily detectible to an adversary.

Silo based ICBMs can be de alerted by placing large, heavy objects over their lids, to remove all of the objects may take days.

Mobile ICBMs could have their warheads removed to be stored in secure facilities at their bases again possibly requiring days for all warheads to be re-install.

Again, both of these could be verified by near real time satellite imagery.

Submarine based missiles could be de alerted by keeping submarines in port unloaded with their missile tube lids open, to be verified by near real time satellite imagery.

They could also be deployed at sea, with ballasts installed along with the MIRV warheads of the missiles to reduce their range and patrol outside the ranges of the missiles, to be verified by broadcasting their approximate location at regular intervals.

The problem with all of these de-alerting techniques is they significantly degrade the survivability of the deterrent force.

Even if we assume that both sides trust each other enough to de alert their forces, if one side becomes suspicious of the other sides activities,

it will try to re alert its forces in response,

creating an incentive for the other side to re-alert its own forces.

This creates a dangerous race to alert where the chance of unintentional nuclear war is significantly increased.

For de alerting to be sustainable both sides must be confident that their ability to respond to an attack will remain intact, this is not possible with full de-alerting so a proportion of the nuclear forces will remain on high alert.

For example, land-based ICBMs in a state of possible high alert, and submarines with unknown positions at sea cannot possibly be verified as on or off alert.

This raises another point, that reducing the alert rate of a system does not necessarily increase decision time.

Let’s consider a silo-based ICBM partially de-alerted to a 14-minute alert rate vs a 4-minute alert rate, where alert rate is the time taken from the order being given to the missile being launched, allowing 1 minute for the missile to fly far enough away from its silo to survive an attack.

We will also assume the attack is from an enemy ICBM with a time of flight of 30 minutes, where it takes 10 minutes from missile launch, to detect the launch, gather satellite and radar information, and relay the information to the head of state.

For the 14-minute alert rate, the missile must be launched no later than 15 minutes before the projected time of impact for the missile to survive, giving 30 minutes minus ten minutes minus 15 minutes equals 5 minutes decision time.

For the 4-minute alert rate, the missile must be launched no later than 5 minutes before the projected time of impact for the missile to survive, giving 30 minutes minus 10 minutes minus 5 minutes equals 15 minutes decision time.

Ultimately the only way to remove the incentive for either side to be pressured into making a quick decision of whether or not they should launch a response to an unconfirmed attack is to make their deterrent force as survivable as possible.

Therefore, it doesn’t matter what the alert rate is or if they launch a response before an attack arrives, or after the attack has taken place.

As long as there are sufficient checks and balances in place to prevent a wrongful launch order and that the launch procedure contains sufficient order verification, nuclear weapons on high alert do not necessarily pose a significant risk.

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW)

Image
In April 2022 Sig Sauer was awarded a contract for the Next Generation Squad Weapons or NGSW program, their entry consisted of, The XM7 magazine fed rifle with a 13.5-inch barrel, The XM250 belt fed machine gun with a 17.5-inch barrel, And the .277 fury bi-metallic cartridge capable of achieving chamber pressures of 80000 PSI, using either the 135-grain surrogate projectile or Sigs own 121-grain General purpose projectile, The XM1186 general purpose projectile will be of the Enhanced Performance Round or EPR type, with a hardened steel penetrator and copper slug encased in a copper jacket. An entire family of 6.8mm ammunition is in development including general purpose, tracer, special purpose, and reduced range projectiles. The special purpose projectile will likely be an aeroshell type projectile with a polymer aeroshell and a tungsten core. Using a Powley Computer, the muzzle velocity of the 121-grain general purpose projectile can be calculated, calibrating the system...
Read more

Should Ukraine Negotiate?

Image
Many have called on Ukraine to negotiate a peace deal with Russia, however, let’s explore why this may not currently be possible. Throughout its history, Russia has tried to expand its boarder westward to form a buffer against European powers. During the Soviet Union, this buffer extended all the way to east Germany. However, when the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia lost its buffer, and instead it tried to prevent its newly independent, neighbouring states from joining western institutions. In February 2014, when Ukraine sought closer ties with the European union. Russia invaded and annexed Crimea and heavily backed a separatist movement in the Donbass, beginning the Russo Ukrainian war. In February 2022, when Ukraine sought NATO membership. Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, seeking to bring Ukraine under its control. In September 2022, Russia annexed Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts in Ukraine, without even controlling all of this territo...
Read more

Nuclear War Scenarios

Image
Nuclear war is an existential risk that looms over us, the consequences of which could potentially wipe out most of the human race. For this video I will be focusing on scenarios between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, but first we need to know what strategic weapons each side has at the ready on a day-to-day basis, starting with the United States. 400 warheads on single warhead LGM-30G Minuteman III missiles in silos, Around 1000 warheads deployed on submarines carrying 20 UGM-133A Trident II D5/LE missiles each, with between 8 to 10 at sea at any one time, 46 nuclear capable B52s, And 20 nuclear capable B2s however about 50 bombers in total are considered deployed at any one time, In summary, The US has a large number of single warhead missiles in silos that require an even larger number of warheads to destroy, a large number of survivable warheads at sea at any time and a reasonably sized bomber force. High alert status enhances the survivabili...
Read more