Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (NC3)

In my last video I explained how the risk of nuclear war can be minimised by making the nuclear deterrent force as survivable as possible, however this all assumes that you have a secure and survivable Nuclear Command, Control and Communications or NC3 system.

If your nuclear forces are able to survive even a full-scale surprise attack from an enemy without having to be launched before enemy warheads reach their targets, then the incentive to launch your forces on an unconfirmed warning of enemy attack is eliminated.

In this case it does not matter if your nuclear forces are on high or low alert or whether you launch your weapons before enemy warheads arrive, or after they have hit their targets, the result will be the same, a response is inevitable.

This reduces the chance that you will view reports of an unconfirmed attack as credible, and therefore responding to it, now both you and your enemy know that they cannot possibly win a nuclear war with you, as you will always be able to respond.

In addition to an NC3 system, early warning systems like radar stations and satellites are essential to ensure you know from which country the potential attack is originating.

NC3 systems are usually based in a countries capitol city, where the leadership resides. This makes the system vulnerable to a surprise attack however to do so would potentially result in a countervalue response against the attackers’ cities, so this type of attack is unlikely.

Another common and more survivable base for an NC3 system is in a command center buried deep inside a mountain, this command center would be protected against blast and radiation to allow it to function in a post nuclear environment. However, these may still be vulnerable to some earth penetrating nuclear bunker buster weapons.

In addition to fixed command centers, some are fitted onto mobile platforms like aircraft that can be more difficult to target, however these are still vulnerable to surprise attack when on ground alert and at least one must be kept airborne at all times to negate this vulnerability.

Another difficulty with NC3 systems is that fixed communications systems such as radio communications stations would be targeted, therefore many different communication systems must be implemented.

A survivable nuclear deterrent must include both a survivable nuclear force and a survivable nuclear command, control, and communications system. If both opposing countries have this, then neither side would be able to win a nuclear war and therefore the chance of nuclear war would be extremely low.

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW)

Image
In April 2022 Sig Sauer was awarded a contract for the Next Generation Squad Weapons or NGSW program, their entry consisted of, The XM7 magazine fed rifle with a 13.5-inch barrel, The XM250 belt fed machine gun with a 17.5-inch barrel, And the .277 fury bi-metallic cartridge capable of achieving chamber pressures of 80000 PSI, using either the 135-grain surrogate projectile or Sigs own 121-grain General purpose projectile, The XM1186 general purpose projectile will be of the Enhanced Performance Round or EPR type, with a hardened steel penetrator and copper slug encased in a copper jacket. An entire family of 6.8mm ammunition is in development including general purpose, tracer, special purpose, and reduced range projectiles. The special purpose projectile will likely be an aeroshell type projectile with a polymer aeroshell and a tungsten core. Using a Powley Computer, the muzzle velocity of the 121-grain general purpose projectile can be calculated, calibrating the system...
Read more

Should Ukraine Negotiate?

Image
Many have called on Ukraine to negotiate a peace deal with Russia, however, let’s explore why this may not currently be possible. Throughout its history, Russia has tried to expand its boarder westward to form a buffer against European powers. During the Soviet Union, this buffer extended all the way to east Germany. However, when the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia lost its buffer, and instead it tried to prevent its newly independent, neighbouring states from joining western institutions. In February 2014, when Ukraine sought closer ties with the European union. Russia invaded and annexed Crimea and heavily backed a separatist movement in the Donbass, beginning the Russo Ukrainian war. In February 2022, when Ukraine sought NATO membership. Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, seeking to bring Ukraine under its control. In September 2022, Russia annexed Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts in Ukraine, without even controlling all of this territo...
Read more

Nuclear War Scenarios

Image
Nuclear war is an existential risk that looms over us, the consequences of which could potentially wipe out most of the human race. For this video I will be focusing on scenarios between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, but first we need to know what strategic weapons each side has at the ready on a day-to-day basis, starting with the United States. 400 warheads on single warhead LGM-30G Minuteman III missiles in silos, Around 1000 warheads deployed on submarines carrying 20 UGM-133A Trident II D5/LE missiles each, with between 8 to 10 at sea at any one time, 46 nuclear capable B52s, And 20 nuclear capable B2s however about 50 bombers in total are considered deployed at any one time, In summary, The US has a large number of single warhead missiles in silos that require an even larger number of warheads to destroy, a large number of survivable warheads at sea at any time and a reasonably sized bomber force. High alert status enhances the survivabili...
Read more